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(ii)

ARGUMENT
I.

STATEMENT RELATING TO FACTUAL ISSUES.
Most of the facts in the present case are not in dispute.

One

fact which

is in dispute

is the

factual

finding

that the

removal of the office complexes would not damage the property.
The photographic exhibits presented at the trial clearly show that
the removal of an adjacent modular office complex left large holes
in the asphalt, conduit and utility stub-outs protruding from the
ground, etc.

Plaintiff believes that the trial court's finding

that the removal of the complexes will not damage the property is
against

the

clear

weight

of

photographic

competent evidence on that issue.
statement

of

facts proffered

evidence,

the

only

Further, Plaintiff disputes the

by Hercules

in that the

interior

walls were not demountable partitions as stated in Paragraph 8 of
the Statement of the Facts contained in Hercules brief but were to
be traditionally finished drywall with vinyl wall coverings.

The

document at Record 170, Exhibit 4, does not specify demountable
partitions

as Hercules would

lead this Court to believe.

The

testimony at the trial was that while demountable partitions were
common in the Modulaire office units, the Hercules units were of
traditional interior wall finish.
Hercules, at Paragraph 21 of its Statement of the Facts, also
erroneously states that the units were not fixed to the ground.
This is simply not true since the testimony at trial

indicates

that the office complexes were attached to underground utilities
1

and services.

The fact that there were not concrete foundations

or piers does not preclude fixation to the ground.
Whether the workers who installed the underground utilities
and

the

asphalt

and

concrete

pavement

would

be

entitled

to

mechanic's lien and payment bond rights is important since there
are

instances

where

services

which

of

themselves

would

not

normally give rise to mechanic's lien or bond rights do give rise
to such rights when performed in conjunction with a construction
project.

See Bachus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956)

and Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967).

If

the actual construction of the office complexes alone does not
give rise to mechanic's lien and bond rights, then when performed
in connection with the installation of the utilities, asphalt,
etc. should give rise to such rights.
II.

PLAINTIFF AND HERCULES ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT AS TO THE LAW
WHICH SHOULD GOVERN IN THIS CASE; THE PERSONAL PROPERTY/
FIXTURE TEST AS STATED IN PAUL MUELLER CO. V. CACHE VALLEY
DAIRY ASS'N. , 657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982) SHOULD NOT APPLY TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
In its brief, Hercules erroneously states that both parties

to this appeal are in agreement as to the law to be applied to the
case at bar.

That assertion is not true.

Plaintiff does not

believe that the personal property/fixture test as stated in the
case of Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P. 2d
1279

(Utah 1982) is applicable to this case.

Plaintiff's
complexes

brief,

while

in question meet

Plaintiff

believes

the Mueller

As discussed
that

test, it is

the

in

office

abundantly

clear that the situation in the case at bar is far different from
2

that in the Mueller case and that the Mueller test should not
apply.
The personal

property/fixture

distinction

as discussed

in

Mueller deals with items which are attached to a building (i.e.,
equipment) rather than to the actual building itself as is the
situation in the present case.

Certainly the same test cannot

apply to equipment and to actual buildings containing more than
25,000 square feet of office space.

To carry Hercules1 logic to

the full extension, one would have to conclude that the metal
building to which the equipment was attached in the Mueller case
does not give rise to a mechanic's lien or to payment bond liability

since

such metal buildings

difficulty.
lienable,

However,

and,

are removable without

the manwalks

in the Mueller

therefore, presumably

the building

too much
case

would

were
be a

lienable item.
For this appeal, the operative

language of the mechanic's

lien statute is "the construction, alteration , or improvement of
any building,
manner."
language

structure or improvement

Utah Code Annotated
of

the

payment

§ 38-1-3

bond

statute

to the premises

in any

(1953).

The operative

is

construction,

"the

addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or
improvement."
1985).

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in

These phrases state the type of work which is covered by

the statutes and object of such.

First, there must be construc-

tion, addition to, alteration, or repair work.
relate

to

(1)

a

"building,"

(2)
3

a

This work must

"structure,"

or

(3)

an

"improvement,"

Historically, when there was never any question

about buildings or a structures being covered by these statutes,
even though they could be moved from the land.
Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363 (1906).

See Sanford v.

It was in connection with

"improvements" that the issue of personal

property v.

fixtures

became critical.
There

is no

reason

to depart

from

that

distinction

now.

Clearly these office complexes comprise buildings or structures or
that they were constructed and placed upon the subject property.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "building" as a

S t r u c t u r e designed for h a b i t a t i o n ,
shelter,
storage, trade,
manufacture,
r e l i g i o n , business, education, and the l i k e .
A s t r u c t u r e or e d i f i c e i n c l o s i n g a space
within walls,
and u s u a l l y ,
but
not
n e c e s s a r i l y , covered with a roof.
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 176.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "structure" as
Any construction, or any production or
piece of work artificially built up or
composed of parts joined together in some
definite manner.
That which is built or
constructed; an edifice or building of any
kind.
A combination of materials to form a
construction
for o c c u p a n c y ,
use
or
ornamentation whether installed on, above, or
below the surface of a parcel of land.
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 1276.
It is important

is no requirement

for

affixation or attachment to the land upon which it is placed.

In

fact

the

definition

to note that there

of

structure

installation above the land.
4

specifically

allows

for

Such

a result

has been

indicated

previously

by the Utah

Supreme Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln
Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968).

The Court stated:

The duty of obtaining a bond as imposed by
Section 14-2-1 is upon: "The owner of any
interest in land" who enters into a contract
to construct an improvement thereon. The word
"land" as used in the law, has since time
immemorial been regarded as a generic term.
It "* * * includes not only the soil, but
everything attached to it, whether by nature,
as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand
of man, as buildings, fixtures, and fences."
This is particularly true with respect to
these lien statutes which should be liberally
construed to effectuate their purposes. This
court has allowed a materialman's lien to
attach to interests less than fee simple, such
as a leasehold estate, an equitable interest,
and a building separate and apart from the
soil upon which it was erected, (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19.
It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court views "buildings" as
separate and distinct from "fixtures."

A building does not have

to be attached to the soil in the same manner as a fixture must be
attached

in order

to give

rights to mechanic's

lien and bond

rights.

It is sufficient that the "building" or "structure" be

placed upon the land.
Hercules would have this Court treat the office complexes as
traditional

personal

property/fixtures.

This ignores the

fact

that the office complexes are buildings or structures to which the
traditional personal property/fixture tests do not apply.
Buildings or structures of the magnitude in this case should
be deemed to be part of the realty upon which they are placed
5

regardless of the manner in which they are placed upon the land.
This is particularly true given the ability of man to move even
traditionally constructed buildings with relative ease and the
advance of technology in the area of premanufactured buildings
which are transported to the site and placed upon the land.

The

case of Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363 (1906) provides
an example of such a situation.

In that case, the Utah Supreme

Court held that where a building is moved from one parcel of land
to another after improvements to the building were made, that a
mechanic's lien could attach to both parcels of land.
The fact that the office complexes in the present case can be
torn apart and moved as individual units should not alter the
outcome as stated in Sanford.

As far as Plaintiff's claim is

concerned, the work required to construct the office complexes was
the same as for any traditionally constructed building.

There was

nothing to alert the Plaintiff that this construction project
would not afford mechanic's lien or payment bond protection as
with any other construction project.
Hercules places a great deal of emphasis on the third part of
the Mueller test, (i.e., intent of the owner).

However, that

element is clearly inappropriate in this case which involves
buildings of considerable size which were procured through a
lease/purchase arrangement between Hercules and its contractor,
Modulaire, when lease/purchase arrangements are routinely used in
commercial transactions as a financing instruments.

This is

particularly true when at the time of trial, the lease period had
6

been

twice

extended

and

to Plaintiff's

knowledge,

the

office

complexes remain on the subject property in which Hercules has an
interest.
Further, any agreement between Hercules and its contractor as
to the status of the office complexes should not be binding on the
Plaintiff herein who was a complete stranger to that transaction,
being thrice removed in the contract chain from the Hercules/U.S.
Government contract and twice removed from the Hercules/Modulaire
contract.

This principal is illustrated in the case of Saunders

v, Kidman, 284 P. 997 (Utah 1930).
real

property

property
between

was part
the

removed.
that

succeeded
of

seller

in establishing

the

and

In Saunders, a purchaser of

realty

despite

a third-party

that

a cabin

a separate

on

the

agreement

that the cabin could be

The trial court found, and the Utah Supreme Court held,

as between

the

seller

and the third-party

the cabin was

personal property but as between the seller and the purchaser the
cabin was part of the realty.
Similarly, in the case at bar, it could be appropriate to
treat

the

Hercules

office
and

Modulaire.

complexes

as

personal

the U.S. Government
But

or

as between Hercules

property

as between

as

between

Hercules

and

and Plaintiff, the office

complexes should be deemed to be part of the realty.

Such a

holding makes good common sense.
Such a holding not only make good common sense, it is in
accord with other Utah case law.

In Metals Manufacturing Co. v.

Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964),
7

the Utah

Supreme Court confronted a situation similar to the one presented
in

the

present

case.

In Metals

Manufacturing,,

the

Bank

of

Commerce held a 10-year lease which provided that the Bank could
"make alterations, attach fixtures, and erect additions * * *"
which would remain the property of the bank and be removed upon
the expiration of the lease.

A second-tier supplier and installer

of metal hand rails and grates made a claim for failure to obtain
a bond and the Bank defended on the basis that the goods did not
become fixtures due to the provisions in the lease specifying that
they remain the personal property of the Bank.

The trial court

ruled in favor of the Bank and dismissed the supplier's cause of
action.

In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court held

that:
[I]t would seem unrealistic and unreasonable
to conclude that [the bank and its contractor]
by agreeing among themselves, could bind third
party suppliers of materials to the terms of
an agreement to which such suppliers were not
privies and the terms of which they did not
know.
Such conclusion could result in the
easy circumvention of the statute whose
purpose clearly is to protect suppliers, if
what they supply falls within the clear import
of the statute, (emphasis in original)
Id. at 395 P.2d 914, 915.
The Utah Supreme Court had another occasion to discuss this
principal.

The

Court

summarized

its

holding

in

Manufacturing as follows:
We held that irrespective of the agreement of
the parties inter se, as to third-party
suppliers, the installation should be regarded
as part of the realty.
It was pointed out
that it would be unfair to bind such suppliers
to the terms of agreements to which they were
8

Metals

not parties and of whose contents they had no
knowledge.
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440
P.2d 17, 18 (1968).
Brothers

As in both the Metals Manufacturing and King

cases, it would

be unreasonable

and

unfair

to

hold

Plaintiff herein to the terms of any agreements between Hercules
and the U.S. Government or between Hercules and Modulaire.
Plaintiff

was

in no position

to determine

the

intent of

Hercules with respect to these office complexes and this Court
should not impose such a burden.

This is particularly true since

the materials furnished by Plaintiff were essentially no different
than those furnished by Plaintiff to any traditionally constructed
buildings.

There was no indication whatsoever that this project

would not afford the Plaintiff protection under the mechanicfs
lien and payment bond statutes.
Further, it cannot be fairly said that based upon the the use
contract

between

Hercules

and the U.S. Government

the parties

thereto intended that the office complexes be personal property.
In

fact, the use contract

Hercules

that

it will

encumbrances.

specifically

keep

Certainly

includes

the property
such

free

a covenant

a covenant by
from

liens

contemplates

and
that

Hercules has an ownership interest sufficient to empower Hercules
with the ability to create a lien on the property and contemplates
that such liens are possible.

See second sentence of Paragraph 8

b of the General Provisions for Use Contract.
Additionally,
between

Hercules

Record at 275.

it cannot be fairly said that the
and

Modulaire
9

contemplated

that

agreement

the

office

complexes

were

to be personal

property

since on

its

fact the

agreement

is nothing more than a financing arrangement

for the

procurement of the office complexes, complete with renewal clauses
and purchase options.

See Record at 240.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks this Court to hold
that the trial court erred in ruling that the office complexes
were personal property which were not affixed to the subject real
property.

Based upon the full facts and circumstance presented to

the trial court, the correct legal conclusion is that the office
complexes do constitute "construction, addition to, alteration or
repair of any building, structure or improvement."
III. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPAL FOR THE MECHANIC'S LIEN AND PAYMENT
BOND STATUTES IS TO ASSURE THAT LABORERS AND MATERIALMEN GET
PAID; WHERE AN IN PARI MATERIA READING OF THESE STATUTES AND
CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER WOULD DEFEAT THIS CLEAR PURPOSE, THE
STATUTES AND CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER SHOULD BE READ
INDEPENDENTLY TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE.
The doctrine of in pari materia should not be used to defeat
the purpose of the mechanic's lien and bond laws.

The doctrine of

in pari materia concerns those statutes which relate to the same
person or thing or have a common purpose.
1979,

p.

711.

Truly,

as Hercules

Blacks Law Dictionary,

has pointed

out, the Utah

mechanic's lien and the Utah payment bond statutes have the same
purpose

(i.e., to assure that laborers and materialmen

payment).

However, Hercules would

have

this Court

receive

apply

the

doctrine of in pari materia to defeat the clear purpose of the
mechanic's lien and bond statutes.

10

The purpose of the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes
is to assure that laborers and materialmen get paid.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated:
As we pointed out in Metals Manufacturing Co.
v. Bank of Commerce, [16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d
914 (1964),] these statutes should be
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to
carry out the purpose for which they were
created: to protect those who supply labor and
materials.
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440
P. 2d 17, 18 (1968).

Hercules would have this Court ignore the

clear and long held purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment
bond statutes.
Hercules would have this Court apply a personal

property/

fixture test which was created in the context of the mechanic's
lien statute to defeat Plaintiff's claim for Hercules failure to
obtain a payment bond.
In
payment

order
to

to

This clearly would be inappropriate.

accomplish

laborers

this

stated

purpose

and materialmen, the Utah

of

assuring

legislature

has

established certain mechanisms to assist laborers and materialmen
to get paid.

The first is the mechanic's lien which allows an

encumbrance upon the property which was improved by the labor or
materials

to

secure

the

payment

of

the

debt.

Usually,

the

mechanic's lien attaches only to the extent of the interest of the
person who contracts for the improvement.
The potential for mechanic's liens being filed against the
property carries with it the possibility that an owner might have
to

pay

twice

for

the

services
11

or materials

received

if

the

mechanic's
supplier.
is that
laborers

lien

claimant

is

a

lower

subcontractor

or

The public policy established by the Utah legislature
it is better
and

for an owner to pay twice

suppliers

go unpaid.

without a means to protect himself.
owner

tier

may

withhold

money

until

all

However,

than to have

an owner

is not

One protection is that the
lien

rights

have

lapsed.

Additionally, an owner may protect himself by obtaining a payment
bond from the parties with whom he contracts.

In fact, the Utah

legislature has obligated owners to obtain payment bonds to assure
the payment of laborers and materialmen.
§§ 14-2-1 et seq.

See Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended in 1985).

Thus owners can

protect themselves simply by complying with the statutory requirement to obtain a payment bond.

If an owner fails to comply with

the bonding requirement, he becomes personally liable to those who
would

have been covered

by such payment bond.

See Utah

Code

Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1985).
Such has been the law in Utah for many years, extending well
before the current code.

In establishing the constitutionality of

the former code's version of the payment bond statute, the Utah
Supreme Court stated this law and policy as follows:
The bond, as in this case is conditioned upon
the faithful performance of the contract and
securing the payment of laborers and materialmen.
If the owner requires the contractor to
procure the statutory bond, he is protected
against loss.
If he does not, he becomes
liable to laborers and materialmen if the
contractor fails to pay them, even though he
may have paid the contractor in full. He has
his remedy in his own hands.

12

Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 246
(1917).
In the case at bar, Hercules could have chosen to protect
itself by requiring a payment bond from its contractor, Modulaire.
In the words of the Rio Grande Court, Hercules had its remedy in
its own hands.

However, it chose not to do so and now asks this

Court to relieve it from its statutory obligation through a misuse
of the doctrine of in pari materia.
The risk of loss and the obligation to obtain the payment
bond is with the owner and when the owner chooses to go contrary
to the statutory requirement, he must be held to the obligations
imposed by the statute.

In such a situation, any close question

ought to be resolved in favor of the unpaid laborer or supplier
since the problem would not have arisen had the owner done what
the statute says he ought to have done (i.e., obtained a payment
bond).

This is especially true when the purpose of the statute is

to assure payment to laborers and materialmen.
If for whatever reason, the mechanic's lien statute is
incapable of achieving the purpose of ensuring payment to laborers
and materialmen, that inability should not be used to thwart the
payment bond statute from achieving the stated purpose of these
statutes.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT HERCULES INTEREST IS
NOT ALIENABLE AND, EVEN IF SUCH INTEREST WERE NOT ALIENABLE,
PLAINTIFF'S MECHANIC'S LIEN IS NOT DEFEATED AS A RESULT.
With regard to the dismissal of .Plaintifffs mechanic's lien

cause of action on summary judgment, the trial court erred in two
13

respects

in ruling

that

Plaintiff's mechanic's

lien could

not

attach to the interest of Hercules in and to the subject property.
First, there is nothing in the Facilities Use Agreement between
Hercules and the United States Government which is an absolute bar
to the alienability

of Hercules

interest

in the property.

In

fact, the Facilities Use Agreement contemplates the possibility of
such

liens.

Second,

there

is nothing

in the mechanic's

lien

statute which requires that an interest in real property must be
alienable

in

order

for

a mechanic's

lien

to

attach.

The

mechanic's lien statute simply states "This lien shall attach only
to such interest as the owner may have in the property."

Utah

Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended).
Whether Hercules interest in the subject property is a lease
is not essential to the attachment of Plaintiff's mechanic's lien
as Hercules would lead this Court to believe.
presented

before

subject property

the

trial

court were

that

for its benefit and gain.

The clear facts
Hercules

uses the

While there is no

doubt that there were certain restrictions placed upon Hercules'
use of the property, there is also no doubt that to the extent
allowed

under

interest

the

in the

use

land.

agreement

Hercules

holds

Further, the use contract

a

possessory
contains no

specific language against alienation of Hercules' interest.
Record at 247.
alienable
employees.

is

See

The only evidence that Hercules' interest is not
the

self-serving

parole

testimony

of

Hercules'

The only competent evidence of as to the alienability

of Hercules interest is the use agreement.
14

Further, the trial court did not make a specific finding as
to the exact nature of Hercules interest in the subject property.
In granting Hercules1 motion for summary judgment on the issue of
whether

Plaintiff's

mechanic's

lien could

attach to Hercules1

interest, the trial court simply concluded that the interest was
not alienable and, therefore, Plaintiff's mechanic's lien could
not attach.

The trial court also held that Hercules does hold an

ownership interest in the subject property which could subject it
to the provisions of the payment bond statute.
From the cases discussed in the briefs, it is clear that a
mechanic's lien can attach to an ownership interest less than fee.
For example, a leasehold may be attached.
interest may be attached.

Additionally, an option

Further, a purchaser's interest may be

attached, even though the sale has not been fully consummated.

If

non-possessory property interests, such as options and purchaser's
interests, may be attached by a mechanic's lien, surely Hercules'
possessory interest may be attached.
Such a conclusion has previously been specified by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln
Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968).

The Court stated:

This court has allowed a materialman's lien to
attach to interests less than fee simple, such
as a leasehold estate, an equitable interest,
and a building separate and apart from the
soil upon which it was erected, (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19.
It is clear that the nature of the ownership interest is not
a critical factor in the attachment of a mechanic's lien since the
15

lien attaches "only to such interest as the owner may have in the
property."

It cannot be disputed that Hercules has some interest

in the property and Plaintiff's valid mechanic's lien should be
allowed to be foreclosed.
V.

CONCLUSION.
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed

to protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for
projects such as the office complexes built for Defendant-Appellee
Hercules.
which

Hercules holds

is sufficient

Plaintiff

an interest

in the

for Plaintiff's mechanic's

respectfully

requests

that

this

subject

property

lien to attach.

Court

decision of the trial court at summary judgment by

reverse

the

reinstating

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien cause of action against the subject
property and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of
that mechanic's lien.
Further, based upon the policy underlying the mechanic's lien
and

payment

bond

statutes,

and

based

upon

the

facts

and

circumstances presented at the motions for summary judgement and
at the trial of the case, the office complexes became part of the
subject real property.

This is the only legal conclusion which

can

from

be

properly

Plaintiff

drawn

respectfully

the

requests

facts
that

presented.
this

Court

Therefore,
reverse

the

decision of the trial court following the trial of the case by
ordering that the trial court enter judgment for Plaintiff on its
failure to obtain a bond cause of action and remand the case for a
determination as to the amount of the judgment.
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DATED this 15th day of August, 1989.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's Reply Brief addresses primarily three issues.
First, Hercules erroneously

states that the parties are in

agreement as to the law which should apply to the case.

Hercules

would have this Court apply the personal property/fixture test
set forth in Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657
P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982).

The Mueller test is inappropriate for the

present case since it involves buildings and structures of significant magnitude rather than handrails, catwalks, dairy equipment, or other such personal property as was involved in the
Mueller case and other Utah payment bond cases.
When an Hercules, an owner of an interest in the subject
real property, contracted with Modulaire to have buildings or
structures placed upon that property, that is all that was
required to obligate Hercules to obtain a payment bond pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended prior to 1987).
All that is required by § 14-2-1 is that an "owner of any
interest in land" enter into a contract involving $2,000 or more
for the "construction, addition to, alteration or repair" of any
"building" or "structure" or "improvement."

Clearly, the office

complexes involved in this case are buildings and/or structures
and are not subject to the personal property/fixture test stated
in Mueller.
The second issue addressed in this Reply Brief is Hercules
attempts to misuse the theory of in pari materia to defeat
Plaintiff's claim.

The theory of in pari materia is applied to

situations dealing with statutes which relate to the same person
or thing or have a common purpose.
S-l

While in many circumstances,

the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes can and should be
read in pari materia,, where such a reading would defeat the clear
purpose of these statutes, such a reading is inappropriate.

The

clear purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes is
to assure

that

laborers

and materialmen

get paid.

Where

procedural or other problems frustrate that purpose for either
the mechanic's

lien statute or payment bond

statute, such

procedural or other problems should not be used to prevent the
other statute from accomplishing the stated purpose.

This Court

should carry out the clear intent of these statutes.
The third issue addressed in this Reply Brief concerns the
trial court's determination that the alienability of Hercules'
interest in the subject property affects whether Plaintiff's
mechanic's lien attaches to such interest.

The alienability of

Hercules' interest in the subject property is not relevant to a
determination of whether Plaintiff's mechanic's lien can attach
to such interest.

While it may affect the marketability of the

property at the foreclosure sale, it does not affect whether the
lien can attach to Hercules' interest.

To rule otherwise is to

encourage lessees and others who hold less than fees simple title
to structure their dealings to avoid the clear intent and language of the mechanic's lien statute which states that the lien
" attach [es] only to such interest as the owner may have in the
property."

Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended).

This

Court should reverse the trial court's determination that the
Plaintiff's lien cannot attach to Hercules' interest in the
subject property.
3-12-grabrply.sum
S-2

